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30 Jul 2026
When the Defendant May Have Been a Victim: What Courts Fail to Examine in Cases Involving Women Who Returned from Syria
- Background
- Research Methodology
- Findings
- “Participation in an Armed Formation”
- How Did the Women Return to Russia?
- Cooking and Laundry: What the Wives of Fighters Are Accused Of
- How Do Courts Assess Women’s Labour and Possible Coercion?
- The “Real Opportunity” to Leave an Armed Formation
- Between 3 and 8.5 Years of Imprisonment
- Can a Victim Be Punished for Acts Committed as a Result of Exploitation?
- Why Is It Important to Move from Stereotypes to a Comprehensive and Individualised Approach?
- Conclusions
The Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre has analysed 50 court judgments concerning the alleged participation of women in armed formations. The analysis showed that, in 33 cases, the women’s statements as recorded in the judgments indicated possible deception, coercion, obstacles to their voluntary departure from the territory, including problems with their documents. In none of the judgments did the court examine these circumstances from the perspective of trafficking in persons.
Background
During the civil war in Syria, several armed groups operated in opposition to the government of Bashar al-Assad. Among the best known were the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) and Jabhat al-Nusra, established in Syria in early 2012 as the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. In July 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra announced that it was ending its ties with al-Qaeda and changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; in January 2017, it became part of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham coalition. All of these organisations have been designated as terrorist organisations and banned in Russia.
At the same time, in criminal proceedings Russian courts generally classify participation in any of these organisations under Article 208(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“Criminal Code”) as participation in an illegal armed formation (“IAF”).
In 2014, at the height of its influence, after ISIS took control of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, the ISIS leader declared the establishment of a caliphate in the territories it had conquered, and the group began referring to itself as the “Islamic State”. In 2017, following the intervention of several states, including Russia, in the Syrian civil war, ISIS began losing the territories under its control. In early 2019, ISIS lost its last major territorial enclave in Syria, but continued to operate as an underground and international network.
Throughout the period of ISIS’s activity, its leadership established extensive recruitment networks targeting men, women and children from around the world. Following the military operations, many male fighters were killed, captured or went underground, while thousands of women and children, including Russian nationals, remained in camps and detention facilities in north-eastern Syria. Tens of thousands of women and children with some connection to ISIS members ended up in the largest of these camps, including Al-Hol and Roj. In February 2026, a UN representative referred to approximately 28,500 people held in Al-Hol and Roj, the overwhelming majority of whom were women and children.
States were therefore faced with the question of how to deal with returning women and children and how to assess the extent of their involvement in the activities of armed formations. We focused on one aspect of this problem: how did Russian courts examine the cases of women who had lived in territories controlled by IAFs after their return to Russia?
Research Methodology
We analysed judgments issued between 2016 and 2026 in cases involving women who had been in Syrian territory controlled by IAFs and subsequently returned to Russia. All of them were accused of participation in armed formations fighting against the government of Bashar al-Assad. Although most of the cases concerned ISIS, the judgments also referred to Jabhat al-Nusra and its organisational successor, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, as well as the more general term “Islamic Front,” which courts use to refer to a coalition of Syrian rebel groups.
A number of limitations of this study should be taken into account:
- The analysis is based exclusively on the texts of judgments issued by courts of first instance. Accordingly, the study makes it possible to assess not the factual circumstances of each case as such, but rather how those circumstances were presented to and assessed by the court when reaching its decision. The level of detail varies substantially from case to case and may depend both on the circumstances of the particular criminal case and on the court’s approach to describing the facts.
- The study does not include interviews with the women or access to other criminal-case materials. We did not contact the women or their representatives to obtain additional information. Accordingly, the circumstances described reflect not the women’s direct statements, but the substance of their testimony as recorded and reproduced by the courts in their judgments.
- We did not examine whether the judgments were upheld by higher courts, but only how the judicial assessment of the circumstances of a case is formed at the first stage.
We also consider it important to avoid references to specific cases, names, or other information that could make it possible to identify the women and their family members, so as not to expose them to additional risks.
Findings
Our analysis of 50 court judgments issued in the Republic of Dagestan between 2016 and 2026 produced the following findings:
- The largest number of judgments was issued in 2022, with a total of 15. The second-highest figure was recorded in 2025 — 9 judgments. These figures reflect only published judgments and not the total number of cases considered in the respective year.
- In 2 out of 50 cases, the charges concerned an attempt to participate in an illegal armed formation. The remaining 48 judgments concerned the women’s actual presence in territory of Syria controlled by IAFs and the conduct of certain activities that the courts qualified as participation in an illegal armed formation. Convictions were issued in 46 of these cases, while two proceedings were discontinued.
- In none of the 50 judgments did the court assess indicators of trafficking in persons.
According to the testimony recorded in the judgments, the women travelled to Syria for different reasons. Some sought to reunite with their adult children; others had been misled by a false portrayal of life under ISIS control and ultimately found themselves trapped once they learned the truth; most often, however, the women followed their husbands.
“Participation in an Armed Formation”
In 2017, it became known that the Russian authorities had begun returning Russian women and their children to Russia on special flights, which generally landed in Grozny. While Chechen women, after completing the necessary formalities (most likely including a formal confession of guilt) were allowed to return home, women from Dagestan, for example, were detained and subsequently prosecuted under Article 208(2) of the Criminal Code (participation in an armed formation for purposes contrary to the interests of the Russian Federation).
At the end of 2017, Federal Security Service (“FSB”) Director Alexander Bortnikov stated that the return to Russia of “former members of illegal armed formations from the countries of the Middle East” represented a “real danger” to the country. Soon afterwards, the state ceased actively facilitating the repatriation of women.
Since then, Russian women, left without money and often caring for children in a foreign country, had to find ways to return home on their own. Despite the obstacles and the lengthy journey, many succeeded. However, they did not know what awaited them at home. What awaited them were Russian law-enforcement and judicial authorities and charges under Article 208(2) of the Criminal Code.
Article 208(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides that participation in an armed formation not provided for by federal law, as well as participation, in the territory of a foreign state, in an armed formation not provided for by the legislation of that state, for purposes contrary to the interests of the Russian Federation (except for cases covered by Part 3 of that Article), is punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight to fifteen years, with restriction of liberty for a term of one to two years.
The Note to the Article provides for exemption from criminal liability for a person who commits the offence for the first time, voluntarily ceases participation in an illegal armed formation and surrenders their weapon, provided that their conduct does not contain another criminal offence.
How Did the Women Return to Russia?
The analysis of the criminal cases shows that the women’s return from Syria to Russia was a lengthy, multi-stage process accompanied by serious administrative and physical obstacles.
The most common mechanism was for women to approach the Russian consulates in Turkey to obtain a certificate permitting entry into Russia; in many cases, relatives did this on their behalf. However, the issuance of documents was sometimes preceded by genetic testing to establish the relationship between the woman and her children, and the procedure could take months or even years.
Before being transferred to the Russian authorities, many women were held for lengthy periods in deportation centres in Turkey, with periods of detention ranging from several weeks to several years.
When the official mechanism was unavailable or too slow, women resorted to informal and more dangerous means of returning. Several cases describe payments to so-called “guides” to cross the Syrian-Turkish border, often after repeated unsuccessful attempts, as well as journeys lasting several days on foot through areas of active hostilities, desert terrain or steppe. In one case, the return to Russia followed a considerably more complicated route through several European states and ended with the crossing of the Russian land border.
Regardless of the route chosen, in most cases the women were detained by law-enforcement officers immediately after arriving at Russian airports.
Cooking and Laundry: What the Wives of Fighters Are Accused Of
Our analysis showed that courts described women’s alleged participation in illegal armed formations in remarkably similar terms across cases, regardless of the specific circumstances of each case.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the women were accused of providing “domestic services,” namely cooking, washing clothes, repairing or sewing clothing (often camouflage clothing). This was accompanied by an almost identical wording, according to which they “performed the functional duties assigned to them as members of the armed formation.”
In some cases, this list was supplemented by providing first aid or working in organised sewing workshops producing military uniforms. At the same time, courts did not distinguish between activities performed for the woman’s own family, including her husband, as expressly documented in the testimony in 21 cases, and activities intended to meet the needs of the armed group as a whole.
The duration of the activities did not affect the courts’ assessment either. The same legal qualification was applied both to activities lasting approximately one and a half months and to years-long residence in Syria and performance of the activities described above.
The courts’ approach to evaluating the subjective element (mens rea) was similarly uniform. In practically all cases, the assertion that the woman had “voluntarily joined an armed formation” was repeated without analysing the circumstances, even where the case materials indicated that the woman had followed her husband, who was a member of an armed formation, or had moved with him before he joined the armed formation. Similarly, information indicating that the accused had been misled, deceived or coerced was in most cases not analysed, even though we identified such circumstances in 33 cases.
The broad interpretation of Article 208(2) by the courts is also demonstrated by two cases concerning attempted participation. For example, one woman was convicted despite having been detained by the Turkish authorities before she had even reached Syrian territory.
How Do Courts Assess Women’s Labour and Possible Coercion?
The courts stated that the women received fixed payments for their “activities” from the “Caliphate treasury”, generally amounting to USD 50–100 per month per adult and USD 25–35 per month per child. A small number of cases referred to work in sewing workshops, where payments were linked to the work performed and amounted to approximately USD 70–80 per month. At the same time, in a number of cases similar payments were made to women whose actual labour activity was not described at all; the courts justified the payments by reference to their status as wives of members of an armed formation.
The analysis of the judgments showed that courts considered women’s receipt of payment for labour or other payments exclusively as evidence of their affiliation with an armed formation, rather than as circumstances characterising the conditions in which they lived or worked.
Remarkably, in none of the examined cases did the courts analyse whether the circumstances established in the case could point to signs of forced labor or trafficking in persons.
Meanwhile, the totality of facts recorded in court decisions, namely, women being transported to Syria by their husbands or relatives, control over their movement, inability to leave the territory independently, including without paying a ''guide", prolonged detention in camps, work in organised sewing workshops for minimal remuneration, and economic dependency, could potentially have indicated that the women were victims of trafficking in persons.
These circumstances could indicate the presence of certain elements of the definition of trafficking in persons set out in Article 3(a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (“Palermo Protocol”). Russia is a party to the Protocol, which requires consideration not only of the nature of the work performed, but also of the means by which a person was recruited, transported, transferred, harboured or received, or otherwise controlled.
Despite the existence in Russian legislation of provisions establishing criminal liability for trafficking in persons and the use of slave labour (Articles 127.1 and 127.2 of the Criminal Code), none of the judgments analysed the facts that could indicate that the defendants may themselves have been victims of these crimes. All facts established in the cases relating to women’s labour and payments were considered exclusively as evidence supporting their participation in an IAF.
This is largely due to the overly broad wording of Articles 127.1 and 127.2 of the Criminal Code, which do not fully correspond to the standards set out in the Palermo Protocol. In particular, they do not specify that the victim’s consent to exploitation is irrelevant where coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person has been used.
Russia lacks an effective legislative framework for identifying potential victims of trafficking in persons, including at the investigative stage. There are also no mechanisms for inter-agency cooperation on this issue and no provisions establishing protection and assistance for victims. In the absence of relevant guidance from the Supreme Court as to which circumstances must be taken into account, judges have no direct guidance for dealing with such highly complex cases.
It is important to note that cases involving marriage as a modus operandi for smuggling should be considered carefully, and indications of such things as exploitation, particular vulnerabilities, and the use of means such as deception and coercion should be red flags for potential aggravated smuggling or trafficking in persons. In these cases, the potential interlinkages with trafficking in persons or forced, abusive or exploitative marriages would need to be assessed. Thus, the mere fact that a woman entered Syrian territory controlled by an IAF, even where that entry was formally regarded as voluntary, as well as the performance of domestic or family-related functions do not, in themselves, establish conscious and voluntary participation in an IAF's activity.
Failure to assess both the nature of the activity and the means for recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons risks overlooking indicators of trafficking in persons and may result in women being treated solely as perpetrators rather than as potential victims of crime.
For example, one court sentenced a woman to eight years’ imprisonment, stating that she had “joined and participated in one of the illegal armed formations [...] performed the duties assigned to her as a member of the formation, consisting of cooking, washing and sewing clothing for members of illegal armed formations forming part of the international terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State’, with the aim of supporting and expanding the activities of the international terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State’.” However, the court did not take into account the circumstances in which the woman had entered territory controlled by ISIS.
The testimony recorded by the court stated as follows:
Extract from the judgment
“She, her husband and their minor daughter arrived by scheduled flight in [location], Syrian Arab Republic, where their son was supposed to meet them. However, at his request, they were met by a taxi driver who was supposed to take them to their son. On the way, at the taxi driver’s request, they handed him their documents and airline tickets. They never saw those documents again.
The taxi driver took them to some place (an open area) where there were armed people, and then left. One of the armed men took them into a shed where there were many adults with children who spoke different languages. They remained in the shed for almost a day, after which they were taken outside at night. For approximately an hour or more, they walked with the children and bags in an unknown direction. When they reached a place where there were many armed people carrying automatic weapons and wearing masks, someone told them to get into cars.
They were then taken to [location] in the Syrian Arab Republic, to a four-storey building, where they were housed.”
This case clearly demonstrates the limitations of an approach under which the court primarily assesses the nature of the functions performed by the woman in territory controlled by an IAF, without paying due attention to the circumstances of her movement and her actual situation. At the same time, the circumstances recorded in the judgment — the confiscation of documents, transportation under the control of third parties, detention in isolation together with other people, and subsequent transfer to armed persons — could have indicated coercion, deception, abuse of power or abuse of a position of vulnerability and other forms of control. However, these facts were not given an independent legal assessment.
This approach is also evident in the courts’ consideration of whether women could voluntarily leave the IAF.
The “Real Opportunity” to Leave an Armed Formation
Under the Note to Article 208 of the Criminal Code, a person who commits the offence for the first time, voluntarily ceases participation in an illegal armed formation and surrenders their weapon is exempt from criminal liability if their conduct does not contain another offence. The Supreme Court has explained that a member of an illegal armed formation who does not possess a weapon may be exempt from criminal liability on the grounds that they voluntarily ceased participation in the IAF, provided that they had an objective opportunity to continue such participation and reported this to the authorities.
At the same time, the judgments analysed demonstrated an exceptionally uniform approach, with courts repeatedly relying on the same reasoning when assessing whether a woman had the opportunity to voluntarily cease her participation in an IAF.
In the majority of cases — specifically, 37 cases — the courts reproduced, almost verbatim, the conclusion that the woman “did not report her participation to law-enforcement authorities despite having a real opportunity to do so” or “did not take voluntary steps to cease participation despite having the opportunity to do so”.
The courts generally do not explain what exactly constituted this “real opportunity”. For example, they do not state how a woman, often accompanied by minor children, could have left territory controlled by an armed group; what routes were available to her in view of possible hostilities; whether she had documents, financial resources and the physical ability to cross the front line independently; or, even more importantly, whether she had any means of informing the Russian authorities of her participation in an illegal armed formation.
The conclusion that a “real opportunity” existed was repeated even in cases where the judgments themselves contain information indicating that women were held in camps for an extended period, that armed guards were present, that their documents had been confiscated, that the armed conflict was ongoing, and that they had to pay “guides” to cross the border, as well as other objective obstacles to leaving independently. Financial obstacles, including the need to accumulate substantial sums to pay “guides,” were likewise not taken into account when courts assessed whether the woman could have left the territory earlier.
Extract from the judgment
“She deeply regretted having believed her husband and gone to live with him in the Syrian Arab Republic, and therefore constantly wished to return to Russia with her children. From the time she arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic, she repeatedly told her husband that she wanted to return home to Russia, but he constantly promised that everything would calm down and that they would return to Russia.”
In many cases, even an escape, voluntary surrender to Turkish military personnel, seeking assistance, or ceasing participation following the death of the husband and making a formal confession immediately after arriving in Russia were not considered sufficient to apply the Note to Article 208. Such facts were considered only as mitigating circumstances. In most cases, this resulted merely in a reduction of the prison term, while in only 12 cases actual imprisonment was replaced with a suspended sentence.
In the overwhelming majority of judgments, the court’s conclusions are inconsistent with the woman’s testimony, with no explanation provided for this discrepancy. Without in any way challenging the credibility of testimony clearly demonstrating severe circumstances, such as restrictions on freedom of movement, the presence of minor children, economic dependency and an armed conflict, the courts nevertheless concluded that the women had failed to make use of the “real opportunity” to cease participation in the formation and report it to the Russian authorities.
Against this background, it is noteworthy that in only two cases did the courts depart from the general practice and discontinue the criminal proceedings.
In one case in 2026, the court established that the woman had independently returned to Russia and subsequently made a formal confession before her detention, and applied the Note to Article 208 of the Criminal Code. In the second case, in 2025, the criminal proceedings were discontinued because the limitation period for criminal prosecution had expired.
Extract from the judgment
“The case file contains no evidence confirming that [redacted]’s presence in the Syrian Arab Republic between 2015 and 2025 was an intentional act specifically aimed at evading investigation and trial.
As follows from the case materials, including [redacted]’s testimony, her departure to Syria in 2015 was motivated by a desire to reunite with her family, while her subsequent prolonged stay there was caused by objective circumstances: the difficult military and political situation in the region, the absence of a real opportunity to freely leave the territory controlled by illegal armed formations, and subsequently her being held in refugee camps.
She herself made repeated attempts to return to the Russian Federation, as confirmed by her actual return in November 2025.”
Against the background of an almost entirely template-based judicial practice, this example appears almost extraordinary.
Between 3 and 8.5 Years of Imprisonment
Our analysis of the sentences imposed on the women show that, despite the relatively severe penalty prescribed by Article 208(2) of the Criminal Code — eight to fifteen years’ imprisonment — the most common sentences were between five and eight years.
This was attributable both to the application of special provisions, such as Article 64 of the Criminal Code in 13 of the judgments examined, and to the application of different versions of Article 208(2), as applicable at the time of the alleged offence.
Under the earlier version of the provision, in force until 2016, Article 208(2) provided for imprisonment of five to eight years.
| Term of imprisonment, years | Number of judgments | Share |
| 3 | 4 | 8.3% |
| 3.25 | 1 | 2.1% |
| 3.5 | 1 | 2.1% |
| 4 | 1 | 2.1% |
| 5 | 18 | 37.5% |
| 5.5 | 1 | 2.1% |
| 6 | 7 | 14.6% |
| 7 | 1 | 2.1% |
| 8 | 13 | 27.1% |
| 8.5 | 1 | 2.1% |
At the same time, the most consistent element of judicial practice under this provision in cases involving women is not the length of the sentence imposed, but the manner in which the sentence is enforced. In more than two thirds of the cases examined, courts imposed actual imprisonment but postponed its execution pursuant to Article 82 of the Criminal Code until the child reached the age of fourteen. This is linked to the fact that most of the women who returned from Syria had one or more children.
Can a Victim Be Punished for Acts Committed as a Result of Exploitation?
If unlawful conduct is the direct consequence of trafficking in persons and exploitation, it is not the victim who should be punished, but those who created the conditions for her exploitation. International bodies and organisations have consistently stated this position.
Thus, the UN Security Council has called upon states to ensure that victims of trafficking in persons are treated as victims of crime and in line with domestic legislation not penalized or stigmatized for their involvement in any unlawful activities in which they have been compelled to engage.
In its 2017 Resolution 2388, the UN Security Council also strongly urged Member States thoroughly to assess the individual situation of persons released from the captivity of armed and terrorist groups so as to enable prompt identification of victims of trafficking, their treatment as victims of crime and to consider, in line with domestic legislation, not prosecuting or punishing victims of trafficking for unlawful activities they committed as a direct result of having been trafficked.
The Recommended Principles prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights provide trafficked persons shall not be detained, charged or prosecuted for the illegality of their entry into or residence in countries of transit and destination, or for their involvement in unlawful activities to the extent that such involvement is a direct consequence of their situation as trafficked persons.
As noted by the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, criminalization and/or detention of victims of trafficking is incompatible with a rights-based approach to trafficking because it inevitably compounds the harm already experienced by trafficked persons and denies them the rights to which they are entitled. In addition, the criminalization of victims is counterproductive to prosecutions because it destroys trust, retraumatizes victims and reinforces what traffickers may have told victims about law enforcement authorities.
A report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) states that, for the purposes of interpreting a provision on exemption from punishment, coercion should correspond to the international definition of trafficking in persons, such as the definition contained in the Palermo Protocol. As a result, a comprehensive understanding of compulsion includes a full array of factual circumstances in which victims of trafficking lose the possibility to act with free will. It includes not only the use or threat of force, but also abduction, fraud, deception and abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability.
Why Is It Important to Move from Stereotypes to a Comprehensive and Individualised Approach?
First and foremost, it is important to recognise that new challenges require the development of legal approaches capable of addressing them in a comprehensive and effective manner. Unfortunately, a template-based approach to combating terrorism and the activities of illegal armed formations may result in potential cases of trafficking in persons remaining unidentified and uninvestigated, while those responsible for exploitation remain unpunished.
International organisations provide detailed recommendations to assist states in help states develop balanced, up-to-date strategies.
Thus, when considering such cases, it is recommended that account be taken of age- and gender-related factors, as well as race, ethnicity and vulnerability. Dependency may be linked to the lack of family or community support, the presence of children and caring needs, lack of knowledge of local languages, economic dependency, ill health, or fear of attacks or reprisals.
The UN Global Survey of the implementation by Member States of Security Council Resolution 1373 recommends that states develop criminal justice response programmes capable of facilitating the rescue, disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of women as victims or perpetrators of terrorist acts, while taking into account the different pathways through which women become involved and the particular circumstances of each woman on the basis of an individualised approach and specific facts.
Further, in the context of marriage — both trafficking for the purpose of forced marriage and the role of marriage in trafficking in persons — the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has emphasised that, in certain circumstances, “husbands” use various methods of control to restrict their spouses’ freedom of movement and freedom of choice, including violence, threats and psychological pressure. When considering such cases, states must bear in mind the possibility of coercion, control, vulnerability, deception and trafficking in persons.
The identification of victims of trafficking in persons is a positive obligation of the state arising from international legal standards, including the Palermo Protocol. These standards are based on the principle that a person’s consent to exploitation is legally irrelevant where coercion, deception, abuse of power or abuse of a position of vulnerability has been used to involve that person.
They also recognise that victims of trafficking may not identify themselves as victims because of psychological dependency, trauma, the normalisation of exploitation, or a lack of awareness of the nature of the experience they have undergone. This is particularly relevant where the recruitment, transfer or transportation of a person occurred during childhood, that is, before the age of eighteen.
Fear of reprisals may also prevent a person from reporting their experience of exploitation. In considering the relationship between trafficking in women and girls and marriage, it is recognised that factors contributing to the vulnerability of women and girls include poverty, unemployment, violence and conflicts, circumstances which create situations where marriage is seen as a social obligation or a means for a better life. In such circumstances, it is the responsibility of state authorities to actively identify indicators of trafficking in persons and exploitation.
Conclusions
Formalism and Template-Based Nature of Judicial Decisions
The judicial practice of the courts of the Republic of Dagestan under Article 208(2) of the Criminal Code in relation to women repatriated from Syria is characterised by extensive repetition, with courts frequently reproducing the same reasoning and formulations almost verbatim. Domestic duties (cooking, washing and sewing clothing) and serving one’s own husband are automatically equated by the courts with “participation in the activities of an illegal armed formation”, without analysing the woman’s individual will or the extent of her involvement in the activities of the armed formation.
Ignoring Objective Obstacles
Courts systematically assert that defendants had a “real opportunity” to cease participation in an IAF and contact the Russian authorities, while disregarding circumstances such as armed conflict, confiscation of documents, armed control of territory, the presence of minor children and women’s financial dependency. As a result, the Note to Article 208 of the Criminal Code, providing for exemption from criminal liability where participation is voluntarily terminated, was applied by courts of first instance in only one case.
Ignoring Facts Indicating Possible Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons
Despite the existence of provisions in Russian legislation establishing liability for trafficking in persons and the use of slave labour (Articles 127.1 and 127.2 of the Criminal Code), courts considering cases involving returning women generally do not examine the possibility of applying these provisions or assess whether the women may themselves have been victims of trafficking in persons.
This practice is largely attributable to the fact that Articles 127.1 and 127.2 of the Criminal Code are too general and do not fully correspond to the provisions of the Palermo Protocol. In particular, they do not specify that a victim’s consent to exploitation is irrelevant where coercion, deception, abuse of power or abuse of a position of vulnerability has been used. Deprived of guidance from the Supreme Court on which circumstances require evaluation, judges lack clear instructions for dealing with such highly complex cases.
Mitigation of Sentences While Maintaining a Presumption of Guilt
Seeking to compensate for the severity of the offence charged, courts routinely impose sentences “below the lowest limit” and apply deferral of sentence execution until children reach 14 years of age. However, this solution is merely a half-measure that preserves a criminal record and convict status for women who ended up in conflict zones under coercion.
The Need to Reform the Approach
To address issues relating to counter-terrorism comprehensively while simultaneously combating trafficking in persons, state and judicial authorities must move away from superficial conclusions and template-based legal qualifications of women’s conduct. Decision-making based on evidence and best practices would enable the authorities to respond appropriately to human rights violations, implement rehabilitation programmes and apply UN recommendations that account for gender and vulnerability factors, thereby ensuring the proper application of international legal standards and the selection of responses appropriate to the circumstances and needs of the persons concerned.
